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Warehouse club (WC) retailers have typically expanded to new markets using stand-alone stores, rather
than pursuing dense store networks as other (non-WC) retailers have in the past. While this strategy
generates operating efficiencies, it also imposes high travel costs on households to shop, which calls into
question WC stores’ resilience to spatial competition from stores operating other formats. We examine this
phenomenon by using data on households’ shopping activity across markets served by Costco Wholesale
stores. Specifically, we evaluate these stores’ resilience to spatial competition by estimating the share of
households’ expenditures relative to travel costs to shop at the stores and comparing this estimate with that
for non-WC stores. Controlling for households’ travel costs across Costco and non-WC stores, we find
that households’ share of expenditures at Costco stores exceeds the share at non-WC stores by 61%. This
suggests that Costco stores have an advantage over non-WC stores when serving market areas with sparse
store networks. Nevertheless, we also find that this advantage diminishes with the distance between Costco
stores and households and that there is a finite distance beyond which this advantage disappears. We show
that this distance (approximately 21 miles) is an important reference point for the evaluation of spatial
competition between Costco stores and other stores and the examination of demand saturation at Costco
stores.
Key words: retail operations; warehouse club; industry study; quasi-experimental design; econometrics
History: Received: November 2017; Accepted: May 2020 by Nicole DeHoratius, after 4 revisions.

1

1.

Introduction

Warehouse club (WC) retailing has become one of the most successful retail formats in the United States.
During the past two decades, WC retailers have experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.9% in sales,
one of the fastest in the industry (Bronnenberg and Ellickson 2015). Today, these retailers generate
approximately $250 billion in annual sales and serve roughly 40% of U.S. households (WCIC 2017). Two
firms, Costco Wholesale and Sam’s Club, dominate the WC retailing industry in the United States. As of
2018, both retailers accounted for more than 90% of the industry’s annual sales—Costco’s share was 56%
and Sam’s Club’s 35% (WCIC 2018). A distinguishing characteristic of these retailers’ stores is that they are
laid out in sparse network configurations (Bhatnagar and Ratchford 2004). According to our estimation,
Costco and Sam’s Club operate only one store in more than 60% of U.S. markets1 in which they compete.
Moreover, in these markets, they have typically waited approximately eight (in the case of Costco) and four
(in the case of Sam’s Club) years between the time they entered the markets and the time they opened a
second store. This strategy stands in contrast to that adopted by non-WC retailers. Safeway and Kroger,
for example, have historically entered new markets by opening multiple stores almost simultaneously and
have expanded the number of stores they operate in each of those areas at a faster pace (Fox and
Sethuraman 2010). As a result, Safeway and Kroger have an average of 29.11 and 18.44 stores per market,
respectively, far exceeding the average number of stores operated by Costco and Sam’s Club (Ellickson et
al. 2017).
The success of WC retailers’ use of sparse store-network configurations in their markets depends
on households’ willingness to incur travel costs to access the stores and provide the revenue the stores need
to operate (Carpenter and Moore 2006). These costs include opportunity costs of time (e.g., Jacoby et al.
1976; Marshall and Pires 2017) and monetary expenditures, mainly from fuel consumption (Ma et al. 2011).
Naturally, with a greater store-network density in the same market, WC retailers may increase households’
access to the stores and reduce their travel costs. In turn, this may boost the revenue retailers obtain from
expenditures by households across the market (Pancras et al. 2012). However, increasing the number of
stores requires significant capital investments in buildings and inventories, which may translate into higher
costs (Basker et al. 2012).
In this sense, accessibility to WC stores represents both a service output controlled by WC retailers
and an input that households may use to model their shopping activity. By using a sparse design for their
store networks, WC retailers are implicitly choosing to maintain their capital investments in buildings and

1 These markets correspond to core-based statistical areas (CBSAs). These areas comprise a population nucleus and adjacent
communities, which are highly integrated both economically and socially. Each CBSA includes at least one county anchored by a
center of 10,000 people or more. An advantage of using CBSAs is that they provide a consistent set of geographic entities for use
in our analysis (see https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf#page=619).
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keep inventory costs low, while imposing high travel costs on households to access their stores. This is why,
when a WC retailer chooses to enter a market with only one store, it must gauge not only the cost advantages
available from using a single store to compete but also the limitations in generating revenue from
households’ expenditures imposed by this strategy (Oi 1988). By imposing high travel costs on households
to access a store, the WC retailer may reduce its resilience to spatial competition (Roy and Thill 2004),
particularly from other stores in the market operated by retailers using non-WC formats, which tend to
have greater store-network densities. Our first objective is to examine this phenomenon. Specifically, we
examine households’ shopping activities to determine the degree of a WC store’s resilience to spatial competition
compared with other stores operating under different (non-WC) formats in the same market.
For a typical household, shopping activities for groceries and other non-durable items commonly
available for sale at a WC store occur recurrently to satisfy consumption needs projected over finite periods
(e.g., weekly) (Bhatnagar and Ratchford 2004). In performing these activities, the household will allocate to
a store a portion of its spending budget for a consumption period along with a fraction of the total travel
costs it has designated to shop during this period (Ailawadi et al. 2018; Ellickson et al. 2017; Messinger and
Narasimhan 1997). To the extent that, for a given travel-cost allocation, households spend a higher share
of their budgets at a WC store than other stores competing in the same market, the WC store will be more
resilient to spatial competition.
This analysis must also account for variations in distance between the WC store and the households
in the market surrounding the store. The retailing literature has traditionally used “gravity” models, initially
introduced by Reilly (1931), to define a store’s market area as a series of radial contours with the store
located at the center and the households located along the contours (Huff 1964). According to this
characterization, the percentage of households’ spending budgets allocated to a store generally decreases
with the distance separating the store from the households located along these contours (Haines et al. 1972;
Nakanishi and Cooper 1974). Thus, maintaining only one store serving an increasingly wider market area
may prevent the retailer from tapping into potential revenue from distant households to a point at which
adding a second store may be justified to ensure that the retailer’s resilience to spatial competition is not
compromised. Our second goal is to examine this phenomenon in the context of a WC store’s market.
Thus, we evaluate how the distance between a WC store and the households across the market erodes the store’s resilience to
spatial competition. To the extent that households’ spending budget allocations to the WC store decrease with
the distance between the store and the households at a faster rate than their travel-cost allocations, the store
will become less resilient to spatial competition.
Our results, based on actual household shopping activity across all major format stores in multiple
markets, show that the ratio of the shares of spending to travel-cost budgets allocated to WC stores is 61%
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higher than the ratio for non-WC stores. That is, for the same fraction of households’ traveling costs
allocated to WC versus non-WC stores, the former capture a share of households’ spending budgets that
exceeds the share captured by the latter by 61%. However, we also find that this advantage decreases as the
distance between WC stores and households increases. According to our results, this advantage all but
disappears when the distance to households reaches approximately 21 miles.
WC retailers may use this benchmark to gain insights into the implications of low-density market
configurations for their stores’ resilience to spatial competition from retailers operating stores under other
formats. For example, our results show that WC stores are significantly less resilient to competition from
general merchandise (e.g., Nordstrom, Kohl’s) stores at distances beyond this benchmark. Moreover, given the
lower competitive resilience of WC stores at distances beyond this benchmark, we demonstrate how WC
retailers can use this value to assess spatial variation in the amount of time necessary for demand at their
stores to reach saturation. Estimating time to saturation is important for WC retailers to be able to
determine when store revenue will reach a steady state, as this will inform store operation plans over the
long run. From our analyses, demand at a WC store needs, on average, almost three years to reach saturation.
However, this duration decreases by more than 12% when we consider only demand within a market
segment bounded by the 21-mile radius benchmark. From these insights, we develop recommendations on
how WC retailers can design assortments and incentive programs to increase households’ propensity to
shop at their stores as a function of the distance between stores and households, while maintaining or
increasing the store-network densities in the markets in which these retailers compete.
Our findings are relevant to the literature on retail operations where, despite the importance of
WC retailers, studies have afforded these firms very little attention. Most research on WC retailers is rooted
in the economics and marketing literature streams (e.g., Ailawadi et al. 2018; Bhatnagar and Ratchford 2004;
Chen 2018; Ellickson et al. 2017; Fox et al. 2004; Hansen and Singh 2009; Inman et al. 2004). Because our
study is grounded in these streams, its findings offer several multidisciplinary contributions to the retail
operations literature.
Consider the results addressing our first research objective. These results show that WC stores
capture a share of households’ spending that exceeds significantly the share captured by non-WC stores
while holding households’ traveling costs allocations to these stores constant. This finding contributes to
prior research on the use of analytical formulations to prescribe optimal solutions regarding the density of
store networks as a function of trade-offs among transportation, inventory, and store facility costs (for a
review, see Daskin 2013). This work has traditionally considered the transportation costs retailers incur
when replenishing inventory at their facilities (e.g., Gallego and Simchi-Levi 1990) or when delivering
products directly from their facilities to households (e.g., Shen and Qi 2007). With few exceptions (e.g.,
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Cachon 2014; Park et al. 2015), researchers have developed models that also incorporate costs external to
the retailers, particularly households’ travel costs. Moreover, in their evaluation of travel costs, these models
have only considered retailers operating as monopolists in their markets. They have considered neither
other retailers patronized by households in the same market nor variations in households’ budget
allocations of their shopping expenses relative to travel costs across these retailers and their store formats.
Our results showing that these allocations can differ in relative terms by more than 60% across formats
provide empirical insights for modeling extensions that relax these assumptions.
Our results addressing our first research objective are also a natural extension to prior analyses that
have examined retailers’ sales as a function of the number of stores in their networks. Using data from
financial statements, these analyses have found that capital investments by retailers in new additional stores
yield, at best, marginally decreasing returns on sales (Gaur and Kesavan 2009; Rajagopalan 2013; Shockley
et al. 2015). However, the level of aggregation in the statements used to obtain the data for the analyses has
hindered the evaluation of these effects within individual markets and across store formats competing in
those markets. Because we use shopping-activity data collected at the household level across multiple
format stores in various markets, we are able to address this limitation to show that these effects vary across
formats. Given that, compared with their rivals, WC stores capture a significantly higher share of household
wallets relative to their share of travel costs, a greater density in WC stores’ networks in the same market is
more likely to yield decreasing returns on sales.
Moreover, our results regarding our second research objective extend prior research that has examined
empirically how variations in the design of retail facility networks can affect retailers’ sales. Pancras et al.
(2012) and Glaeser et al. (2019) examined how retailers can increase the density of their networks to
improve sales while minimizing sales cannibalization among facilities. In addition, Fisher et al. (2019)
evaluated how an expansion in the number of warehousing facilities can increase sales in the context of
online retailing. In particular, they focused on improvements reflected in faster delivery, brought about by
an increase in the number of warehouses in the network operated by an online retailer and the impact of
these improvements on sales. Our study is similar to these works in that it also evaluates households’
spending allocations depending on the distance between a WC store and households across a market.
However, it differs in that it uses this evaluation to examine reductions in resilience to spatial competition
compared with non-WC rivals rather than other WC stores in the same network.

2.

Theory Development and Hypotheses

A store’s resilience to spatial competition is a function of its strength of market “gravitation” (Huff 1964;
Reilly 1931). In turn, according to research on spatial shopping behavior, a store’s strength of market
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gravitation is a function of the share of spending households are willing to allocate to the store in relation
to the share of travel costs they incur shopping at the store. That is, gravitational strength depends on how
effective a store is in inducing households to incur the travel costs to acquire an increasingly larger share of
the products they need (Hubbard 1978). Three format attributes contribute to explain a store’s gravitational
strength and, therefore, its resilience to spatial competition.
The first format attribute is the use of pricing strategies based on hi-lo versus every-day low prices
(EDLP). According to Fox et al. (2004), households’ spending elasticity relative to travel costs is lower in
store formats in which households can find products at consistently low prices. Therefore, given WC stores’
focus on offering EDLP across their assortments, Ellickson et al. (2017) argued that households’ spending
at these stores is highly inelastic relative to travel costs. Moreover, they observed that households’ increases
in spending at WC stores are accompanied by decreases in food expenditures at restaurants and other
venues outside the retail industry. That is, the low elasticity in expenditures at WC stores relative to travel
costs appears to be subsidized in part by households’ cuts in food expenditures at non-retail establishments.
The second attribute is the use of fixed ancillary fees for purchases. These may involve minor fees
per transaction (e.g., parking fees, shopping bag fees) or more substantial charges, such as those required
by WC retailers as part of the annual membership fees that households pay to shop at WC stores. These
membership fees become sunk costs that households typically justify with frequent shopping trips and large
baskets, making travel costs less relevant in their decisions to patronize WC stores (Ailawadi et al. 2018).
Models by Coyte and Lindsey (1988) and Wang and Yang (2010) on the role of retailers’ two-part tariffs in
shaping spatial shopping behavior provide a similar interpretation of this phenomenon. In the case of WC
retailers, two-part tariffs consisting of annual membership fees and shopping charges for products available
at their stores carry greater benefits for the households willing to assign an increasingly larger share of their
spending budgets to these stores (Kim and Choi 2007).
The third attribute is the size of the packages used by stores to sell their products. In the case of WC
retailers, stores rely exclusively on pack sizes that considerably exceed those available at non-WC stores and
set the prices for these packs using nonlinear schedules in which products carry significantly higher perunit discounts than those offered at non-WC formats (Hartmann and Nair 2010). As a result, some
households will have significant incentives to buy products at WC stores in amounts exceeding those they
would otherwise buy at other formats (Ailawadi et al. 2018). Moreover, research has shown that when
households buy products in these pack sizes, they end up increasing their rate of consumption (Ailawadi
and Neslin 1998; Bell et al. 1999) because these packs have greater salience in their use (Chandon and
Wansink 2002; Wansink and Deshpandé 1994). In the end, an increase in spending on large package sizes,
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combined with a higher rate of consumption, leads to a higher share in household spending at WC stores
(Ailawadi et al. 2018). Thus, to the extent that this spending share increases at a marginally higher rate
relative to the share of travel costs assigned to WC stores, the rate between the share of households’
spending and travel costs at WC stores will exceed that at non-WC stores, as will the WC stores’ resilience
to spatial competition. Our first hypothesis follows from this argument as well as from those of the
preceding attributes:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). A WC store is more resilient to spatial competition relative to other stores operating
in the same market under different (non-WC) formats.
Sparse store networks, such as those commonly set up by WC retailers, may also exhibit significant
variation in the distances separating individual households from their nearest stores. In turn, this variation
may influence households’ share of shopping expenditures at WC stores in relation to their share of travel
costs allocated to the stores to make those expenditures. Research on spatial behavior based on gravity
models has provided initial insights into this phenomenon by predicting a negative relationship between
households’ store patronage and distance to stores (Haines et al. 1972; Huff 1964).
More recently, empirical analyses of store choice have validated many of these insights. For
example, analyses have found that households tend to patronize stores located closer to them (Leszczyc et
al. 2004; Singh et al 2006). Thus, as the distance between a WC store and households increases, households
are less likely to shop at the store altogether. A reason for this behavior is that households are less willing
to assume stock-out risks when visiting stores in remote locations (Grewal et al. 2012). Another reason is
that it is more time efficient for households to search for and compare products by patronizing stores in
closer proximity to themselves (Ratchford and Srinivasan 1993). Other analyses have found that as the
distance between a store and households that choose to shop at the store increases, the proportion of
expenditures these households allocate to shop at the store decreases with their distance to the store.
According to Fox and Thomas (2006), this follows from households’ decisions to allocate a higher share
of their wallets to shop at stores located closer to them.
Together, these arguments suggest that households’ share of expenditures at a WC store will
decrease with their distance to the store. Moreover, to the extent that households located farther from a
WC store travel a greater distance to shop at the store, we expect that, as the distance between the
households and the store increases, households’ share of shopping expenditures at the store will marginally
decrease relative to the share of travel costs assigned to shop at the store. This leads to our second
hypothesis regarding WC stores’ resilience to spatial competition:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A WC store’s resilience to spatial competition relative to other stores operating in the
same market under different (non-WC) formats decreases with the distance between the store and the
households in the market.
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3.

Empirical Methodology

To test our hypotheses, we must first identify an empirical setting conducive to generating valid marketwide
estimations of households’ spending and travel-cost budget allocations at WC and non-WC stores and
variations in these allocations as a function of the distance separating households from WC stores. To that
end, we chose to evaluate markets with stores operated by a focal WC retailer as single, stand-alone facilities.
Despite our focus on these particular markets, our selection is reflective of common industry practice
because, as indicated previously, the leading WC retailers in the industry operate only one store in many of
the markets in which they compete. Moreover, because our focus on single, stand-alone WC stores will
produce marketwide estimations under the lowest levels of store density, we can test our hypotheses under
more stringent conditions than those found in markets with more stores.
For our analysis, we chose Costco as the focal WC retailer as it accounts for most of the WC retail
industry’s sales in the United States. Costco’s market share in this industry has fluctuated between 50 and
60% for most of the past 20 years, making it the leading WC retailer in the country (WCIC 2018). Moreover,
we focused on Costco’s single, stand-alone store operations in five different markets located in El Paso,
Tex.; Des Moines, Iowa; Greensboro, N.C.; Hoover, Ala.; and Myrtle Beach, S.C. While Costco had no
more than one store in operation in each of these markets during our analysis, its non-WC competitors had
at least two stores in operation and an average of 5.24 stores per market. Thus, consistent with our previous
discussion, accessibility to Costco stores in these markets lagged behind that of stores operated by non-WC
retailers.

3.1. Data
For each of the five markets, we assembled a panel of household shopping activity data collected from
ACNielsen’s Homescan and data on store locations obtained from the Environmental Systems Research
Institute (ESRI). The Homescan data cover participating households’ shopping trip–level data across all
major national and regional retail format stores. Therefore, the data include information on the participating
households’ shopping activity at Costco and at all other format stores. For the purpose of our study, we
use ACNielsen’s format categorization to define the composition of other format stores by type, that is,
grocery stores, drugstores, general merchandise stores, and supercenter stores. This categorization is
consistent with that used in the literature (Allcott et al. 2018; Bronnenberg et al. 2012; Hausman and Leibtag
2007; Inman et al. 2004; Jaenicke and Carlson 2015). Table 1 provides a sample account of retailers in each
format and characterizes the formats along dimensions of assortment breadth, pricing strategy, and
accessibility (based on typical number of stores per market). We used the studies of Bell et al. (1998), Briesch
et al. (2009), and Ellickson et al. (2017) to inform these characterizations.
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Table 1 Format Characteristics
Retail format
Grocery stores
Drugstores
Gen. merchandise stores
Supercenter stores
WCs

Sample retail stores
Safeway, Kroger
Walgreens, CVS
Sears, Macy’s
Walmart, Target
Costco Wholesale

Assortment breadth
High
Low
High
High
Medium

Pricing strategy
Hi-lo
Hi-lo
Hi-lo
EDLP
EDLP + Membership fees

Accessibility
High
High
Medium
Low
Low

From the Homescan panel, we converted the trip-level data into weekly data and computed each
household’s weekly expenditures (Spent), excluding sales taxes, at Costco stores and at stores operating
under retail formats different from Costco’s in each of the markets. Doing so allowed us to measure
shopping expenditure allocations by households across stores over finite periods, consistently with the
budget allocation conceptualization discussed previously. From the panel, we also obtained household-level
demographic data, including address information for all households. We used this information along with
the Costco stores’ addresses (from Costco’s store directory) to estimate the distance between each
household and the Costco store in its market. The data also included information about key household
characteristics likely to affect households’ shopping activity at Costco’s stores (Ailawadi et al. 2018;
Bhatnagar and Ratchford 2004; Ellickson et al. 2017; Fox et al. 2004), such as number of members in the
household (household size), age of household head (or combined age when there is more than one head in
the household), household income, and preexisting membership at another WC retailer. This information
forms the basis for the control variables in our analysis along with retail gasoline prices ($/gallon), which are
likely to influence households’ travel costs (Ma et al. 2011). We collected the gas price information from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s state-level database.
The data obtained from the ESRI business locations’ directory provide detailed address
information on all retail stores in the United States during our analysis. Therefore, from this data set we
obtained the addresses of all retail stores operating in the markets in which households in the Homescan
panel made their purchases. We then used these addresses, along with the address information for the
households in the panel and for the Costco stores, to estimate the mileage for every household shopping
trip recorded in our data set across all markets during the analysis. To estimate the mileage for each trip,
we used a great-circle-distance approach (see Appendix A for alternative approaches). We then aggregated
this trip-level mileage on a weekly basis to compute the vehicle mileage (Mileage) each household allocated
from its weekly travel-cost budget to visit Costco and each of the other format stores. This enables us to
measure households’ travel-cost allocations across stores over finite periods, consistently with the budget
allocation conceptualization discussed previously.
To measure the resilience of each Costco store to spatial competition from non-WC stores, we
compare households’ share of weekly spending (Spent) relative to their share of weekly travel costs (Mileage)
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allocated to Costco with their shares of Spent relative to Mileage allocated to non-WC stores in every market.
To do this, we treat households’ shopping activity as a counterfactual to generate measures that reflect
spending and travel-cost allocations at these stores from households that choose to shop at Costco’s stores,
after controlling for the allocations we would have observed if the households had chosen not to shop at
these stores. The goal is to obtain measures that are free of biases introduced by these allocations’
endogeneity with respect to unobserved household attributes and unobserved conduct by retailers. The next
section expands upon the empirical design we used to address these considerations.

3.2. Empirical Design
For our analysis, we use a quasi-experimental design with a treatment application corresponding to households’
decisions to become Costco members and begin shopping at the stand-alone Costco store in their market
after the store’s entry. This design enables us to evaluate allocations at the Costco stores by households
that become members of these stores in relation to their activity at other competing stores (regardless of
format) both before and after the start of households’ memberships at Costco. Moreover, we evaluate these
households’ allocations in relation to those of comparable households that choose not to become Costco
members. Through this approach, we can account not only for unobserved, time-invariant household
attributes but also for unobserved changes in conduct among retail incumbents (e.g., store openings and
closures) caused by each Costco store’s market entry.
Costco entered with a stand-alone store each of the five markets we chose for our study at different
times between December 2003 and December 2005. Hereafter, we refer to these markets and their Costco
stores as our “treatment markets” and “treatment stores,” respectively. Moreover, we refer to households
that became Costco members and began shopping at the treatment stores as “treatment households” and
households that chose not to become Costco members and thus did not patronize the treatment stores as
“control households.” For our analysis, we collected data from Homescan and ESRI between April 2003
and September 2006 across all treatment markets. We refer to the time between these two dates as the
“focal period of analysis.” We chose these starting and ending dates for the focal period of analysis to
ensure that we have the observations necessary to generate stable, long-term measures on all households’
shopping activity before the earliest Costco store opening date and after the most recent Costco store
opening date across all treatment markets.
Figure 1 illustrates the quasi-experimental design. Recall that, contingent on their subscription date
to Costco, households in the treatment group start shopping at Costco’s stores at different times after the
stores have entered the markets. As such, the start time of the treatment application differs across these
households. Our goal is to evaluate the effect of the treatment application by comparing the differences in
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the values of the variables based on Spent and Mileage between treatment and control households both
before and after the treatment application.
Figure 1 Quasi-Experimental Design

3.3. Sampling of Treatment and Control Households
Having discussed our study’s experimental design, we now explain the procedure we followed to select the
treatment and control households for our analysis. We then expand on the reliability of the data obtained
from the household sample as well as the generalizability of the sample.
3.3.1. Treatment and Control Household Selection Procedure. Our selection of the treatment
households across the five treatment markets follows five conditions:
1. The household is located in a treatment store’s market area. The boundaries in these areas provide
a reference to define the maximum distance between every Costco store and the households it
serves. In our case, the maximum distance in every one of these markets did not exceed 35 miles.
2.

The household remains in the Homescan panel for at least 100 days before and after the treatment
application (i.e., before and after the household began shopping at its treatment store).

3.

The household records in the Homescan panel at least one shopping trip to any retail store in any
five-week period during the focal period of analysis.

4.

The household records more than one shopping trip to its treatment store in the Homescan panel
after the opening of the store.

5.

No records of trips to Costco exist for the household before the opening of the treatment store.
Condition 1 ensures that the treatment store is the nearest Costco store to the treatment household.

Condition 2 ensures that the shopping histories for each household will generate stable long-term results
for the averages of Spent and Mileage before and after the treatment application. Condition 3 enables us to
exclude households that may not have faithfully reported their shopping activity as part of their
participation in the Homescan panel. Condition 4 identifies households that are actually Costco members.
Although households must pay a membership fee to shop at Costco, they could request a one-visit pass to
shop at a store without becoming members. Condition 5 ensures that the effects we examine are due
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exclusively to our study’s treatment stores. That is, this condition ensures that any purchase at Costco in a
treatment market is attributed to its treatment store (after its opening date).
We identify the control households in a similar way and, from the same treatment markets, using
conditions 1–3. We only slightly modified condition 2 to include households that remain in the panel for
at least 200 days, to ensure a consistent lower bound in the length of shopping activity timelines between
control and treatment households. The household selection criteria resulted in 540 households for our
analysis: 70 treatment households and 470 control households, with five treatment stores opening in five
treatment markets. The final panel of treatment and control households comprises 73,700 household-week
observations, summarized in Table 2. We verified that households in the panel recorded at least one
purchase in 82% of the weeks during the period of analysis and that none of the Mileage values in the
observations exceeded an upper bound of 181 miles. Values above this limit are likely not to be
representative of households’ shopping travel behavior.2
Table 2 Panel Data Overview
Parameter
No. of total households
Total observations
Shopping observations
No. of treatment households
No. of control households

Value
540
73,700
60,413
70
470

3.3.2. Data Reliability and Sampling Generalizability. Although researchers in marketing and
economics have extensively used Homescan data to examine a variety of retailing phenomena (e.g.,
Bronnenberg et al. 2008, 2012; Gordon et al. 2013; Hartmann and Nair 2010), operations management
researchers may not be familiar with these data and thus may have concerns about their reliability. Appendix
B addresses these concerns, particularly those arising from possible deficiencies in the coverage of retail
stores and reporting errors in the data we obtained from our household sample.
Another concern may be the generalizability of the sample. In the past, authors have documented
the process that ACNielsen follows in assembling the Homescan panel to ensure generalizability relative to
the broader population (Aguiar and Hurst 2007; Einav et al. 2010). We expand on this in Appendix C.
Notwithstanding ACNielsen’s rigor, our own evaluation (also in Appendix C) confirms that the households
sampled across the markets had a variety of attributes relevant to the generalizability of our findings that
closely matched those in the broader population.

2

We obtained this limit using Weekly Mileageupper limit = Max. grocery shopping travel time per week × Avg. travel speed by car. We estimated
the maximum amount of travel time per week allocated to grocery shopping per household to be 5.66 hours, using the 2003
American Time Use Survey (Brown and Borisova 2007). Furthermore, we estimated the average travel speed by car in the United
States to be 32 mph using information from the U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of Statistics’ 2003 Ride to Work
Survey (Ride To Work 2003).
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4.

Results

Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics of our data in the weeks households registered shopping activity. These
include the mean, the standard deviation, the median, the minimum, and the maximum values estimated
for treatment households, for control households, and for all households (treatment + control) during the
periods before and after the treatment application.
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics

Control Variables (Household-Level)

activity)

Weekly Mileage (Mileage)
(for weeks with shopping

Weekly Spending (Spent)
($ pre-tax, for weeks with
shopping activity)

Parameter
At all stores
Mean (SD)
Median
[Min, Max]
At Costco store
Mean (SD)
Median
[Min, Max]
At other stores
Mean (SD)
Median
[Min, Max]
At all stores
Mean (SD)
Median
[Min, Max]
At Costco store
Mean (SD)
Median
[Min, Max]
At other stores
Mean (SD)
Median
[Min, Max]
Distance to Costco
store (miles)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Size (no. of people)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Income ($/year)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Combined age of
heads (years)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Gas price ($/gallon)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Households with prior
WC memberships
outside Costco

Treatment households
(N= 70)
Pretreatment
Posttreatment

Control households
(N= 470)
Posttreatment
Pretreatment

All households
(N= 540)
Posttreatment
Pretreatment

89.65 (85.83)
67.45
[2.68, 810.98]

98.71 (95.54)
72.92
[2.27, 1,273.61]

86.15 (84.30)
63.02
[2.01, 1,040.02]

90.97 (92.66)
67.39
[2.02, 1,435.59]

86.69 (84.54)
63.58
[2.01, 1,040.02]

91.97 (93.03)
68.06
[2.02, 1,435.59]

-

72.82 (75.65)
49.37
[3.35, 510.65]

-

-

-

72.82 (75.65)
49.37
[3.35, 510.65]

89.65 (85.83)
67.45
[2.68, 810.98]

85.90 (85.89)
62.58
[2.27, 1,273.61]

86.15 (84.30)
63.02
[2.01, 1,040.02]

90.97 (92.66)
67.39
[2.02, 1,435.59]

86.69 (84.54)
63.58
[2.01, 1,040.02]

90.29 (91.77)
66.84
[2.02, 1,435.59]

35.74 (33.18)
25.71
[0.50, 178.78]

32.83 (31.08)
23.69
[0.50, 180.00]

46.36 (38.70)
35.74
[0.50, 180.46]

44.82 (37.24)
34.86
[0.50, 180.88]

44.75 (38.10)
33.60
[0.50, 180.46]

43.27 (36.72)
33.08
[0.50, 180.88]

-

9.28 (6.16)
7.49
[2.98, 70.00]

-

-

-

9.28 (6.16)
7.49
[2.98, 70.00]

35.74 (33.18)
25.71
[0.50, 178.78]

31.51 (30.84)
22.10
[0.50, 179.79]

46.36 (38.70)
35.74
[0.50, 180.46]

44.82 (37.24)
34.86
[0.50, 180.88]

44.75 (38.10)
33.60
[0.50, 180.46]

43.03 (36.77)
32.74
[0.50, 180.88]

15.45 (10.27)
11.93 [1.49, 35.00]

23.16 (14.10)
20.13 [1.49, 35.00]

22.19 (13.91)
19.17 [1.49, 35.00]

2.50 (1.23)
2.00 [1.00, 6.00]

2.50 (1.32)
2.00 [1.00, 8.00]

2.50 (1.31)
2.00 [1.00, 8.00]

56,504.75 (27,861.83)
55,000 [11,000, 100,000]

50,282.25 (26,132.63)
42,500 [2,500, 100,000]

51,063.74 (26,436.38)
47,500 [2,500, 100,000]

99.37 (27.38)
112.00 [42.00, 130.00]

86.83 (28.77)
84.00 [27.00, 130.00]

88.51(28.91)
89.00 [27.00, 130.00]

1.54 (0.436)
1.44 [0.98, 2.54]

1.57 (0.44)
1.47 [0.98, 2.54]

1.57 (0.439)
1.47 [0.98, 2.54]

46

203

249

From the data, we estimated the average values, aggregated across all stores and all treatment
markets, for Spent and Mileage for the treatment households and compared them statistically (using t-tests)
with the average values estimated for Spent and Mileage for the control households before the treatment
application. We performed the same analysis for the period after the treatment application. To compute
these values, we summed the weekly expenditures and miles allocated across households and divided these
sums by the total number of observations for both the pre- and the posttreatment periods.
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Our results show no statistical difference in the average Spent value between treatment ($89.65) and
control ($86.15) households before treatment. However, they indicate that the average Mileage value
pretreatment is statistically lower for treatment households (35.74 miles) than for control households (46.36
miles) by a margin of 10.62 miles (∆ = 35.74 – 46.36 = –10.62 miles, p = 0.00). Then, when we compare
the average Mileage and Spent values estimated for treatment households (32.83 miles and $98.71) with the
values estimated for control households (44.82 miles and $90.97) after treatment, we observe that treatment
households still travel, on average, statistically fewer miles per week than control households (∆ = 32.83 –
44.82 = –11.99 miles, p = 0.00). However, these households now spend, on average, a statistically higher
weekly amount than control households (∆ = $98.71 – $90.97 = $7.74, p = 0.00). These results suggest
that, compared with control households, treatment households experienced a statistically significant
expansion in their spending relative to travel-cost allocations to shopping trips after they began patronizing
Costco.
Armed with these results, we offer insights into the role of shopping activities at Costco in this
expansion. We begin by estimating the differences in average values (for all stores, across all treatment
markets) for Spent and Mileage for the treatment households before versus after the treatment application
($98.71 – $89.65 = $9.06, p = 0.00; 32.83 miles – 35.74 miles = –2.91 miles, p = 0.00). We also estimated
the same differences but only for the non-WC stores ($–3.75, p = 0.02; –4.23 miles, p = 0.03) and subtracted
these differences from the differences estimated for all stores for Spent (∆ = $9.06 + $ 3.75 = $12.81, p =
0.00) and for Mileage (∆ = –2.91 + 4.23 = 1.32 miles, p = 0.00). These differences correspond to the averages
for Spent and Mileage at Costco, respectively. We then divided the average for Spent at Costco by the average
Spent by treatment households at all stores after treatment to estimate the average share of the total spending
$12.81

budget per household allocated to Costco !$98.71 = 0.1298#. We also estimated the share for Mileage
1.32 miles

!32.83 miles = 0.0402#. According to these shares, a household allocates 12.98% of its spending budget to
0.1298

Costco but only 4.02% of its travel costs. Finally, we compared the ratio of these shares !0.0402 = 3.23# with
0.8702

the ratio !0.9598 = 0.91# obtained from the shares that treatment households allocated from their spending
and travel-cost budgets to non-WC stores after becoming Costco members !
31.51 miles
32.83 miles

$85.90
$98.71

= 0.8702 and

= 0.9598#. This comparison suggests that an equivalent percentage increase in the allocation of

households’ travel costs to Costco and non-WC stores generates an average increase in the share of
households’ shopping expenditures assigned to Costco stores that is much larger than that assigned to nonWC stores. For an equivalent share of households’ travel costs allocated to Costco stores and to non-WC
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3.23

stores, the former capture a share of households’ spending budgets 3.55 times !0.91# larger than the share
captured by the latter.
These findings provide model-free evidence consistent with our expectation of WC stores’ greater
resilience to spatial competition than that of non-WC stores. However, this evidence is only preliminary
because it makes no attempt to control for factors, other than our treatment effect, that could account for
Spent and Mileage variations. In particular, it fails to account for potential endogeneity concerns that may
bias our Spent and Mileage estimations. Next, we elaborate on how we address these through the use of a
difference-in-differences (DID) analysis.

4.1. DID Application
We use our DID analysis to test H1 based on the following strategy. First, we focus on non-WC
stores to estimate the parameters governing the relationships between percentage increases in Spent and
Mileage before versus after treatment among treatment households in relation to percentage increases in
Spent and Mileage among control households. Second, we perform the same estimation for the Spent and
Mileage parameters for all stores (including Costco) and subtract from these parameters the values for the
Spent and Mileage parameters estimated for non-WC stores. Support for H1 is contingent on obtaining a
value statistically greater than 1 for the ratio (ηCostco ) between the value estimated in the second step for the
difference of the Spent parameters and the value estimated for the difference of the Mileage parameters.
Because these parameters correspond to the percentage increases for Spent and Mileage at Costco stores
estimated in relation to the rest (non-WC) of the stores in the markets, a ratio greater than 1 would indicate that
Costco stores are more effective at inducing households to satisfy a larger share of their periodic shopping
needs, while holding travel costs assigned across WC and non-WC stores constant.
To test H2, we focus on Costco’s stores in our treatment markets to estimate the parameter
corresponding to the moderating effect on treatment households’ Spent at Costco’s stores by the distance
between each of these stores and each of the treatment households located in the markets where the stores
operate. We then perform a similar analysis to obtain the parameter estimate corresponding to the
moderating effect on treatment households’ Mileage by distance. Support for H2 is contingent on the
estimate for the former parameter being statistically lower than that for the latter.
We note that as part of our DID application to test these hypotheses, we control for time-invariant
but geographically variant factors (e.g., household socioeconomic attributes) potentially responsible for the
endogeneity in households’ decisions to join or not join Costco. These factors are represented by the
control variables identified in section 3.1 (i.e., household–Costco store distance, household size, household
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income, age of household heads, preexisting membership by household at another WC retailer, and retail
gas prices paid by household). Because the endogeneity attributed to these factors can yield biased estimates
of Spent and Mileage, we mitigate this concern by applying two propensity score adjustment (PSA)
procedures (see Appendix D). The first procedure uses adjustment measures on control households that
share the same observed characteristics, represented by the control variables, as households in our
treatment group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The second procedure uses sampling weights to add
regression weights to each observation based on the values for the control variables across treatment and
control households (Hirano and Imbens 2001; Hirano et al. 2003; Rosenbaum 1987). Because the latter
PSA procedure (known as propensity score weighting or PSW) is better suited to mitigate low comparability
between treatment and control households along variables such as household income or distance to Costco,
the results we present in the body of the paper use this procedure. We use the former procedure (known
as propensity score matching or PSM) as a robustness check (see Appendix D). Note that although we
included in the PSW and PSM procedures a factor that controlled for households’ preexisting memberships
at other WC retailers before Costco’s entry in the markets, we explicitly evaluated the influence of these
memberships on the results from our hypotheses tests. The results from this evaluation (Appendix E)
provide empirical support for this factor’s inclusion among the control variables in the DID analysis.
The Appendix also includes the results of several procedures we conducted to evaluate the validity
of the results obtained from the DID analysis to test the hypotheses. Appendix F includes the results of a
parallel trends assumption test. These results provided no evidence to suggest that there are different trends
in the pretreatment measures of Spent and Mileage between the treatment and control groups. Thus, we rule
out the possibility that the observed changes in Spent and Mileage were simply a consequence of pretrend
conditions. Appendix G includes a series of placebo tests to check for spurious correlations that could bias
our estimates in the DID analysis using the PSW procedure. The objective of these tests is to detect
unobserved external shocks tied potentially to changes in conduct by retail incumbents in those markets
due to Costco’s entry. Prior research has observed this type of phenomena among incumbents after entries
by other major retailers in their markets (Matsa 2011; Singh et al. 2006). Appendix H includes a robustness
check for potential endogeneity in Costco’s decisions to enter the treatment markets that could bias our
estimates in the DID analysis using the PSW procedure. This robustness check involved retesting the
hypotheses using an alternative sampling strategy based on a “look-ahead matching” procedure, such that
instead of drawing control households from our five treatment markets, we sampled control households
from five different markets in which Costco entered immediately after our focal period. The results from the
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robustness tests in Appendices G and H, obtained using the PSW procedure, showed no evidence of these
biases in the estimates from our DID analysis presented below.

4.2. Evaluating Costco Stores’ Resilience to Spatial Competition
We use the following DID specifications to evaluate the effect of the treatment application on households’
shopping activity in the treatment markets:
log(Sit +1) = aS,0i + γS,t + βS,3 AFTER it × TREATi + εS,it ,

(1a)

log(Mit +1) = aM,0i + γM,t + βM,3 AFTER it × TREATi + εM,it ,

(1b)

where Sit and Mit represent Spent and Mileage for household i at week t. We log-transformed Sit and Mit
because the distribution of Spent and Mileage exhibits right-skewness due the presence of strong spikes at
low values and a long tail at high values. We expect to observe spikes at low values given that we are tracking
households’ shopping activities on a weekly basis, whereas the long right tail is a result of higher activity
measures contributed primarily by households of larger sizes and incomes. With the log transformations,
we can minimize biases in the estimated effects that might be introduced by values in the long tail and
obtain a better model fit. Moreover, as we show subsequently, by using the log transformations we can
generate directly from the DID analysis the percentage estimates of the treatment effects on Spent and
Mileage to estimate the measures to test H1.
The binary variable TREATi equals 1 if household i belongs to the treatment group and 0
otherwise. The binary variable AFTER'( equals 1 if week t corresponds to the posttreatment period (i.e.,
after household i subscribed to Costco’s membership) and 0 otherwise. Next, a denotes household fixed
effects to control for household heterogeneity, and γ accounts for time fixed effects (one dummy for each
week) due to temporal shocks (e.g., seasonality). The coefficients for AFTERit × TREATi are the main
parameters of interest. The term AFTERit × TREATi is the interaction between a dummy variable
indicating that household i is in the treatment group (TREAT' ) and a dummy variable indicating that an
observation corresponds to the period after subscription to Costco (AFTER'( ). Thus, βS,3 and βM,3
capture the change in the dependent variables of interest for treatment households after subscribing to
Costco relative to control households that did not participate in the membership program.
The terms εS,it and εM,it represent independent and identically distributed Gaussian random shocks.
We use White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for robust inferences (Wooldridge 2010). We
chose not to use cluster-robust standard errors because our observations are clustered across only five
markets, making the use of cluster-robust variance estimation inappropriate because of the “few cluster”

17

problem (Cameron and Miller 2015). Moreover, the inclusion of household fixed effects in our model
would absorb away common shocks responsible for within-cluster correlations among errors and
ameliorate clustering effects driven by common shock processes caused by geographic and economic
factors, for example (Cameron and Miller 2015).3
We also chose not to estimate Equations (1a) and (1b) using a full specification comprising the
first-order effects (i.e., AFTERit and TREATi ), because after including the household fixed effects and
time fixed effects, the coefficients for TREAT' and AFTER'( are unidentifiable, as the former absorb the
effects of the latter. The household fixed effects and time fixed effects serve the same purpose as the firstorder effects TREAT' and AFTER'( in these regressions. Therefore, we exclude these first-order terms in
our model specification for clarity of exposition.
Building on the identification strategy we discussed at the beginning of section 4.1, we ran two sets
of regressions, one for Spent and Mileage at stores operating under formats different from Costco’s (SOther
and
it
All
MOther
) and one for Spent and Mileage at these stores as well as Costco’s (SAll
it
it and Mit ). Tables 4 and 5 present

the results. Note that these results are consistent with those obtained when limiting the maximum distance
between each Costco store and the households in its market to 30 and 25 miles (see Appendix I for the
results). We set these two alternative limits to curtail potential biases in our results induced by shopping
activities in markets adjacent to those in our study carried out by households located at distances close to
the 35-mile maximum distance observed in our study’s markets. As indicated in section 3.3.1, we chose 35
miles as the limit for the market radius in the analyses presented in the body of the paper.
According to the linearized coefficients for AFTERit × TREATi in Table 5, Spent and Mileage
expanded by 21.09% (e0.1914 – 1) and 14.25% (e0.1332 – 1), respectively, after households began shopping at
Costco. Thus, expenditures across all retail stores and mileage amounts allocated to shop at these stores
increased significantly when households began shopping at Costco. Moreover, according to the linearized
coefficients for AFTERit × TREATi in Table 4, this rise in spending and mileage amounts is partly due to
a 9.22% (e0.0882 – 1) increase in expenditures at stores operating formats different from Costco’s as well as
a 6.88% (e 0.0665 – 1) increase in the mileage amounts allocated to shopping across these stores.
The balance remaining after we subtract the increases in SOther
and MOther
observed at stores
it
it
All
operating formats different from Costco’s (9.22% and 6.88%) from the increases in SAll
it and Mit observed

3 Nonetheless, to test the validity of our approach, we checked for the presence of clustering by conducting a series of tests (Donner
and Klar 2000) using the CLTTEST (Herrin 2012) command in STATA. Through these tests, we estimated the cluster-adjusted tvalues and intracluster correlations (ICC) among errors of the dependent variables obtained from the models involving non-WC
stores and all retail stores. The results show that the models’ errors are weakly correlated within clusters (minimum and maximum
ICC of the residuals is 0.016 and 0.187, respectively) (Donner and Klar 2000; Nicols and Schaffer 2007).
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at these non-WC stores plus Costco (21.09% and 14.25%) represents the contribution to the expansion in
All
SAll
it and Mit made by households’ Spent and Mileage at Costco’s stores. Specifically, of the 21.09% increase

in Spent observed across all stores, 11.87% corresponds to Spent at Costco stores. Moreover, of the 14.25%
increase in Mileage allocated to shopping across all stores, 7.37% corresponds to Mileage at Costco stores.
Table 4 Spent and Mileage at Stores Operating under Formats Different from Costco’s Stores
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Seasonality
PSW
Observations
# Households
Adj. R2

Spent (SOther
)
it
0.0882* (0.0438)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.258

Mileage (MOther
)
it
0.0665* (0.0323)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.374

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 5 Spent and Mileage at All Retail Stores
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Seasonality
PSW
Observations
# Households
Adj. R2

Spent (SAll
it )
0.1914*** (0.0443)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.258

Mileage (MAll
it )
0.1332*** (0.0331)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.373

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

As we estimated the percentages for Spent (11.87%) and Mileage (7.37%) at Costco stores compared
with those for the rest (non-WC) of the stores in their markets, we can test whether the ratio of these percentages
(ηCostco ) is statistically greater than 1. Evidence to that effect will indicate that Costco stores are more
effective than non-WC stores at absorbing a higher share of households’ spending in relation to travel costs.
According to our results and a bootstrapping analysis (in Appendix J), ηCostco is indeed statistically greater
0.1187

than 1 !0.0737 = 1.61# (p < 0.05). In practical terms, the value obtained for ηCostco indicates that for an
equivalent percentage of travel costs assigned to Costco stores and non-WC stores, the share of spending
at Costco stores exceeds the share at non-WC stores by 61%. Thus, consistent with H1, Costco stores are
more resilient to spatial competition relative to non-WC stores operating in the same market.

4.3. Evaluating Costco Stores’ Resilience to Spatial Competition as a Function of Distance
to Households
We use the following difference-in-difference-in-differences (or so-called triple DID) model specification
to evaluate the moderating effect on treatment households’ share of mileage amounts and expenditures

19

allocated to Costco by the distance between each of the five Costco stores and each of the treatment
households, i, located in the markets in which each of the stores operates (FARi ):
𝑙og(Sit +1) = aS,0i + γS,t + (βS,4 +βS,5 FARi ) × AFTER it × TREATi +εS,it ,

(2a)

𝑙og(Mit +1) = aM,0i + γM,t + (βM,4 +βM,5 FARi ) × AFTER it × TREATi +εM,it .

(2b)

The notations and modeling specifications are the same as before, except for the addition of FAR' and its
interaction terms ( AFTER'( × TREAT' × FAR' ). 4 The coefficients for these interaction terms
(βS,5 and βM,5 ) are the main parameters of interest, because they capture the moderating effect of distance
on treatment households’ Spent and Mileage assigned to Costco’s stores. As explained in section 4.1, an
estimate of βM,5 exceeding that of βS,5 will lend empirical support to H2.
According to the results in Table 6, as the distance between treatment households and the Costco
store in their market increases, the households increase their share of weekly mileage amounts assigned to
shop at the store. For every mile increase in the distance separating a household from the Costco store, the
household’s share of weekly mileage amounts increases by 0.40% (p < 0.01) compared with the average
market amounts. Our results also show that the share of weekly expenditures that households allocate to
shop at the Costco store decreases with the distance separating the households from the store. For every
mile increase in the distance separating these households from the store, their share of weekly expenditures
decreases by 0.34% (p < 0.01) compared with the average market amounts.
Table 6 Moderating Impact of Distance on Spent and Mileage at Costco Stores
TREAT×AFTER×FAR
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Seasonality
PSW
Observations
# Households
Adj. R2

Spent
-0.0034* (0.0016)
0.4724*** (0.0304)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.265

Mileage
0.0040*** (0.0009)
0.1719*** (0.0139)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.274

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

The juxtaposition of these moderation effects indicates that while the share of households’
expenditures at a Costco store marginally decreases with the distance separating households from the store,
the share of mileage amounts households allocate to shop at the store marginally increases. Thus, in line
with H2, a Costco store becomes less resilient to spatial competition than non-WC stores operating in the
4 We did not include the interaction terms AFTER × FAR and TREAT × FAR in the estimations of the models in Equations
it
i
i
i
(2a) and (2b) because the coefficients for these terms would be unidentified due to collinearity with FARi × AFTER it × TREATi
and the household fixed effect parameters.
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same market as the distance between the households and the store increases. Moreover, similar to the
results in Tables 4 and 5, these results are consistent with those obtained when limiting the maximum
distance between each store and the households in its market to 30 and 25 miles (see Appendix I).

5.

Implications for the Design of Store Market Areas

In this section, we first extend our analyses to quantify how distances between Costco stores and
households in each treatment market contribute to decrease Costco store’s resilience to spatial competition
as reflected in ηCostco . With this evaluation, we estimate a distance threshold in which ηCostco converges to 1.
Then, we show how this threshold provides a benchmark that Costco (as well as other WC retailers) can
use to identify boundaries in its markets beyond which its stores may be less resilient to spatial competition
than non-WC stores. This is because the share of shopping expenditures allocated to non-WC stores by
households beyond this threshold will exceed that allocated to Costco stores, while holding the share of
travel costs allocated to non-WC stores equal to those allocated to Costco stores. Finally, we conclude with
an examination of spatial variation in the amount of time required for demand at Costco stores to reach
saturation. Our objective is to evaluate how the distance threshold we estimated in each of these stores’
markets affects the duration between the time the stores enter their markets and the time the growth in
revenue these stores obtain from new subscribers’ expenditures converges to zero.

5.1. Quantifying Limits to Costco Stores’ Resilience to Spatial Competition Imposed by
Market Radii
We know from section 4.2 that ηCostco = 1.61. This value of ηCostco is equivalent to the one we would observe
if all treatment households in each market were located equidistantly to the store at a radius equal to the
. ) is
average distance between a Costco store and the households in its market. In our case, this distance (D
.=
15.54 miles, calculated by D

∑#j=1 ∑"i=1 dij × vi
I

, where I is the total number of treatment households in our

sample, J is the total number of markets in our sample, dij is the distance (in miles) separating household i
from the store in market j, and vi is an indicator that specifies whether household i is in market j (vi = 1 if
yes, 0 otherwise).
Adding the parameter estimates for βS,5 and βM,5 in Table 6 to ηCostco 0

0.1187+[-1e0.0034 -12]
0.0737+(e0.0040 -1)

3, we find

that a one-mile increase over the average market distance (i.e., 15.54 miles) separating households from
Costco’s store in their markets reduces ηCostco to 1.48. This is a 0.126 (or 7.8%) reduction in ηCostco . However,
as we show in Figure 2, the drop in ηCostco over the distance above the market average of 15.54 miles is
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nonlinear, and at 6.07 miles above the average market distance, ηCostco = 1. This marks an “equilibrium
threshold” for the market radius (21.61 miles = 15.54 + 6.07) beyond which Costco stores may become
less resilient to spatial competition than non-WC stores.

𝜂Costco

Figure 2 Changes in ηCostco over Distance above the Market Average of 15.54 Miles
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Notes: The vertical bars straddling the function in the figure represent the 95% confidence
interval of each value of ηCostco .

As a technical note, recall that the 21.61-mile value we obtained for the threshold is based on point
estimates for ηCostco = 1.00 (i.e., 0.1187, 0.0737, 0.0034, and 0.004) and these estimates do not allow for a
statistical evaluation to determine whether the value of ηCostco at this threshold is statistically different from
0 but not statistically different than 1. To perform this evaluation, we used a bootstrapping procedure
similar to the one we used in section 4.2 to generate the values of the standard error (0.082) and the 95
percent confidence interval [0.918; 1.082] for ηCostco at the 21.61-mile threshold. With these values, we are
able to ascertain that the value for ηCostco at this threshold is, indeed, statistically different from 0 but not
statistically different than 1. We repeated this analysis for a range of values 2 miles below and 2 miles above
21.61 and found that for values below 20.61 miles, ηCostco is statistically higher than 1, and for values above
22.61 miles, ηCostco is statistically lower than 1. Therefore, ηCostco may be statistically equivalent to 1 at
threshold values that range from 20.61 to 22.61 miles. For the analyses in sections 5.2 and 5.3, we use the
midpoint of this range (21.61 miles) as the equilibrium threshold.

5.2.

Applying the Equilibrium Threshold to Gauge Spatial Competition for Households’
Expenditures

Our goal is to examine whether Costco stores’ ability to compete for revenue against other format stores
is statistically higher in areas in which their markets are bounded by distances equivalent to the equilibrium
threshold and, if so, how significant the geographic extension and revenues from households in these areas
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are for these stores. For this analysis, we ran the model for Spent in section 4.2 for trips to stores operating
under each of the non-WC format categories (i.e., grocery stores, drugstores, general merchandise stores,
and supercenter stores) in Table 1. We obtained results from this analysis for (1) an unconstrained radius,
(2) a radius limited to the equilibrium threshold of 21.61 miles, (3) a radius length 10 miles above the
equilibrium threshold, and (4) a radius length 10 miles below the threshold. Table 7 presents these results.
As the coefficients for TREAT × AFTER in Table 7 show, households that joined Costco
significantly increased their expenditures at drugstores but significantly decreased their expenditures at
supercenter stores, independent of the length used for the market radius. Together, these results indicate
that while drugstores benefited significantly from households’ decisions to join Costco, supercenter stores
experienced a significantly negative impact from households’ decisions to join Costco. Moreover, these
effects appear pervasive across all households in the markets.
Table 7 Change in Spent across Non-WC Store Formats after Households Started Shopping at Costco

Grocery stores:
TREAT×AFTER
Drugstores:
TREAT×AFTER
General merchandise stores:
TREAT×AFTER
Supercenter stores:
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Seasonality
PSW
Observations
# Households
Adj. 𝑅6

Spent
unconstrained
0.0474
(0.0415)
0.0584*
(0.0282)
-0.0396
(0.0458)
-0.1511***
(0.0441)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.376

Spent
equilibrium + 10 mi.
0.0538
(0.0434)
0.0494*
(0.0295)
-0.0573
(0.0480)
-0.1684***
(0.0465)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.216

Spent
equilibrium
0.0739
(00464)
0.0618*
(0.0308)
-0.1088*
(0.0514)
-0.1334**
(0.0494)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.320

Spent
equilibrium – 10 mi.
0.0468
(0.0740)
0.1112*
(0.0533)
-0.1470*
(0.0817)
-0.1645*
(0.0735)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.203

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

The substitution effects observed for supercenter stores are intuitive given the similarities between
the supercenter and WC store formats outlined in Table 1. 5 Indeed, several supercenter stores in the
treatment markets closed two to three years after Costco’s entry, perhaps because of these substitution
effects. Conversely, the spillover effects observed for drugstores are likely the result of households’
increases in expenditures at these outlets to supplement their purchases at Costco. As assortments at Costco

5 Specifically, Table 1 shows that supercenter stores share similar characteristics to those of WC stores and differ mainly by
charging no membership fees and carrying a wider range of stock-keeping unit assortments.
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stores are limited, these supplementary purchases may include brand- or variety-specific products that
households need but Costco does not carry (e.g., personal hygiene items, over-the-counter medications).
The results in Table 7 also show a significant degree of substitution at general merchandise stores
by households located at distances from Costco’s stores below the equilibrium threshold. General
merchandise stores experienced an average decrease of 10.88% in revenue from these households after they
began shopping at Costco. This effect is not only statistically different from zero but also statistically
different from the (nonsignificant) effects estimated when we include households located at distances beyond
the equilibrium threshold. By contrast, this effect is not statistically different from the effect estimated (–
0.1470) when we limit the market radius to a length 10 miles below the equilibrium threshold. Appendix K
presents the results of the pairwise χ2 tests (df = 1) we used to make these comparisons.
The substitution effects observed for stores operating under supercenter formats and for stores
operating under general merchandise formats suggest that Costco stores compete directly against stores
under both these formats. However, while the substitution effect observed for supercenter stores is
widespread in every market, this effect is more localized for general merchandise stores. Supercenter stores
lose approximately 14% to 17% of revenue they generate from households after households become
Costco members and regardless of the households’ market locations. In the case of general merchandise
stores, this reduction is approximately 11% to 15% but involves only the households located at distances
from Costco below the equilibrium threshold. Households located at distances beyond this threshold do not
alter their expenditures at general merchandise stores. This result is a reflection of Costco stores’ relatively
stronger position to spatial competition over other format stores within market areas bounded by distances
equal to the equilibrium threshold. Moreover, the size of these areas relative to that of their entire markets
is significant. First, the geographic extent of these areas (based on a 21.61-mile radius equivalent to the
equilibrium threshold) is, on average, almost 40% of their markets’ entire geographic coverage (based on a
35-mile radius). Second, the revenue from households in these areas accounts for 75% of the revenue from
all households in the stores’ markets. For Costco stores, a continued participation in their markets will
depend on their ability to remain competitive in these areas and prevent a reduction in the areas’ sizes.

5.3. Applying the Equilibrium Threshold to Evaluate Demand Saturation at Costco
Stores over Time
Given the stronger position of Costco stores over spatial competition at distances below the equilibrium
threshold, we now apply this benchmark to assess spatial variation in the time required for demand at these
stores to reach saturation. Demand at Costco stores will reach saturation when the growth in revenue the
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stores generate from new members’ expenditures converges to zero. This characterization is consistent with
that used by researchers to explain, for example, decreasing marginal returns in sales with respect to larger
inventory replenishment amounts at retail stores (Caro and Gallien 2010) and decreasing marginal returns
in travel volume among households with respect to greater access to transportation options (Metz 2010).
In our case, we measure the time until demand at a store reaches saturation, starting when the store enters
the market and ending when the growth in revenue the store obtains from new members’ expenditures
converges to zero.
For a retailer, estimating time to saturation is important to determine when a store’s revenue will
reach a steady state. In turn, the retailer may use this assessment to inform long-term store operation plans
as well as decisions on when to open new stores in the market, provided there is enough demand to support
additional stores. In our analysis, we begin by estimating the time until demand at each Costco store reaches
saturation. We then compare this duration with the time estimated when we only consider segments in the
markets comprised of households located at distances below the equilibrium threshold. Evidence showing a
significantly longer time to saturation when considering markets in their entirety than the time to saturation
when focusing only on market segments bounded by the equilibrium threshold will indicate longer delays
in absorbing new members’ expenditures beyond these threshold boundaries, in which Costco is less
resilient to competition from other retailers.
Because the time that demand at a Costco store needs to reach saturation is equivalent to the time
until the growth in revenue the store generates from new members converges to zero, we estimate the
effect on Spent at Costco stores by households’ delays in joining Costco as new members. To that end, we
use a triple DID model specification by interacting AFTER it and TREATi with JOINi . The JOINi
variable measures the number of weeks elapsed from the time Costco entered each of the treatment markets
until the week each of the treatment households first purchased at their markets’ stores:
𝑙og(Sit +1) = aS,0i + γS,t + (βS,8 +βS,9 JOINi ) × AFTER it × TREATi +εS,it .

(3)

The notations and modeling specification in Equation (3) are the same as those in section 4.3
except for the addition of JOINi and its interaction term (AFTERit ×TREATi ×JOINi ).6 Moreover, we
estimated the parameters in Equation (3) with and without limiting the radius in each market to the

6 We did not include the interaction terms JOIN × AFTER and JOIN × TREAT in the estimation of the model in Equation
it
i
i
i
(3) because the coefficients for these terms would be unidentified due to collinearity with JOINi × AFTER it × TREATi and the
household fixed effect parameters.
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equilibrium threshold length (21.61 miles). The coefficients estimated for TREATi × AFTER it × JOINi
(in Table 8) suggest that, regardless of the length of the radius, there is a negative effect on Spent caused by
the number of weeks separating Costco’s market entry and households’ decisions to begin shopping at
Costco. That is, for every additional week that a household waits to begin shopping at the Costco store in
its market, there is a decrease in average weekly expenditures at the store. These results are intuitive, as the
households that begin shopping at Costco’s stores soon after they enter their markets (early subscribers)
are likely to have a greater affinity for Costco than households that waited longer to subscribe (late
subscribers).
Table 8 Moderating Impact of JOIN on Spent at Costco Stores

TREAT×AFTER×JOIN
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Seasonality
PSW
Observations
# Households
Adj. R2

Spent
unconstrained
-0.0066*** (0.0011)
-0.0026 (0.0252)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.180

Spent
equilibrium threshold
-0.0074*** (0.0011)
0.0164 (0.0285)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.194

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

We then use the TREATi × AFTER it × JOINi coefficients estimated for Spent in Table 8 to
calculate the amount of time until demand at a store reaches saturation, when considering the store’s market
as a whole and focusing only on the market segment bounded by a distance equivalent to the equilibrium
threshold. According to these coefficients, saturation will occur approximately 135 weeks (2.6 years) after
the opening of the store if we limit the distance to the equilibrium threshold (135.14 = 1/0.0074) versus
almost 152 weeks (approximately 3 years) if we do not constrain this distance (151.52 = 1/0.0066). The
relative gap between these values is 12.12%. Moreover, according to a χ2 test (df = 1) of mean differences
between the coefficients for TREATi × AFTER it × JOINi in Table 8 (χ2 = 10.20, p = 0.0014), this 12.12%
gap is statistically different from zero.
Thus, constraining the length of the radius to the equilibrium threshold significantly decreases the
time required for the store to absorb the demand available in the market from new household members.
This implies not only that demand at Costco stores is more resilient to spatial competition from other stores
at distances below the equilibrium threshold but also that these stores are able to absorb this demand sooner
than the demand elsewhere in their markets.
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6. Conclusion
A key attribute of WC retailers’ stores is that they are laid out in sparse network configurations conducive
to supporting high operating efficiency. However, this type of configuration limits households’ accessibility
to the stores, thereby increasing their travel costs when buying from WC retailers. In this sense, accessibility
to WC stores represents both a service output controlled by the WC retailer and an input that households
use (along with product prices) to model their shopping activity. Therefore, by choosing a sparse design
for their store networks and limiting households’ accessibility to the stores, WC retailers are implicitly
making a trade-off between maintaining low operating costs to compete on prices and imposing on
households’ travel costs to overcome limitations in accessing the stores.
The effectiveness of this trade-off depends on how sensitive households’ expenditures at WC stores
are to travel costs compared with their expenditures to access non-WC stores. We examine this
phenomenon by using data on households’ shopping activity across different markets served by a WC
retailer’s (Costco) stand-alone stores. The granularity of these data enables us to estimate the share of
households’ spending and travel-cost budgets allocated recurrently to shop at Costco stores and to compare
their ratio with that estimated for non-WC stores. We find that, holding households’ travel costs constant
across non-WC and Costco stores, the latter are able to absorb a share of households’ spending budgets
that exceeds the share captured by the former by 61%. As a result, in general, WC stores have a competitive
advantage over other format stores when serving market areas with sparse store networks.
Nevertheless, we also find that this advantage diminishes with the distance between WC stores and
households. Specifically, as our analysis of Costco shows, there is an equilibrium threshold of approximately
21 miles beyond which this advantage disappears. This threshold can serve as an important reference for
evaluating spatial competition between WC stores and stores operating under other formats and for
examining demand saturation dynamics at WC stores. According to our results, WC stores compete directly
for households’ expenditures against general merchandise and supercenter stores operating in the same
markets. However, WC stores are significantly more resilient to competition from general merchandise
stores for expenditures among households located within the boundaries set in the market by the
equilibrium threshold. While WC stores are able to appropriate, on average, 11% of general merchandise
expenditures from households located below the equilibrium threshold, they are significantly more limited
in their ability to compete for these expenditures beyond the threshold. Our results also show that demand
at stores has a shorter time to saturation among households located below the equilibrium threshold than
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among households located beyond this threshold. On average, the time to saturation among the former
group of households is more than 12% shorter than among the latter group.
The results from our analyses can guide WC retailers in evaluating stand-alone stores’ performance
in generating revenue after entering new markets. This evaluation should consider spatial variation in
revenue obtained from households as a function of their distance to the stores. Our results show that
households located at distances from WC stores below the equilibrium threshold account for three-quarters
of these stores’ revenue, on average. In markets in which revenue shares from these households exceed this
figure, WC retailers might consider the option of adding a second store located at a distance from the first
store beyond the equilibrium threshold. Naturally, the decision to open a second store will depend on other
considerations, such as the second store’s ability to generate enough revenue to offset its operating costs
and the amount of revenue it may cannibalize from the first store.
If WC retailers’ decision is to maintain stand-alone stores in their markets, they might take our
results showing spillover effects in expenditures at drugstores by WC households as evidence of the positive
effect of assortment expansions in personal hygiene, medications, and related categories on their stores’
revenues. WC retailers might also use our results to design incentives to induce households located beyond
the equilibrium threshold to begin patronizing their stores sooner. These incentives may include discounted
membership fees or free-trial membership periods offered to these households soon after the stores’ market
entry. WC retailers could also leverage these results to design programs with the goal of increasing
households’ propensity to shop at WC stores. These programs could target households located beyond the
equilibrium threshold by offering them online access to buy assortments (e.g., apparel, hardware, home
furnishings) that compete with those offered by general merchandise stores and by giving them the
opportunity to have these items delivered free of charge. Naturally, WC retailers will need to account for
the costs of providing home delivery services as part of the program. Our experience with several managers
at Costco shows that they often use this type of incentive to induce members to buy more. Moreover, they
estimate home delivery costs to account for approximately 20% of the revenues they generate online.
Therefore, for them, these programs are better suited for the type of products found in general merchandise
stores than for products in the grocery category, which tend to have lower margins, making it difficult to
absorb the free delivery costs.
Future research might examine the resilience of WC retailers to spatial competition from retailers
operating online and offering households the opportunity to have their purchases delivered directly to their
homes. Given the lower transaction costs incurred by households online, we believe these findings could
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potentially enrich our results, which focus mainly on spatial competition from brick-and-mortar retailers.
In addition, examining households’ online shopping activity provides an opportunity for a more robust
investigation into households’ valuation of store accessibility by taking into account purchases made
without households’ allocation of travel miles to shop at retail stores.
Last, research could also replicate our study to evaluate shopping activity at Sam’s Club and
supercenter stores owned by Walmart. Over the years, Walmart has followed a “contagious diffusion”
strategy to expand its networks of supercenter and Sam’s Club stores in tandem over short distances from
its initial market locations in the southeastern United States (Holmes 2011). This strategy stands in contrast
to that examined in this paper, in which Costco has traditionally chosen to enter markets considered most
attractive (as a function of economic size, population density, and so on) independent of whether these
markets were adjacent to those in which it already operates. Thus, compared with Walmart’s networks
combining supercenter and Sam’s Club stores, the networks we considered tend to have lower densities
because the stores are typically separated by longer distances. Future research might apply the methodology
we use in this paper to examine Walmart’s contagious diffusion strategy to expand its network of Sam’s
Club and supercenter stores. The goal is to compare the logistics benefits afforded by this strategy with the
higher levels of cannibalization it imposes on sales at other Sam’s Club and supercenter stores already in
operation.
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Appendix
A. Estimating Shopping Trips’ Mileage Using Road-Network versus Great-Circle
Distances and Trip-Chaining versus Point-to-Point Trip Policies
Using the great-circle-distance approach as the basis for the mileage calculations in our analyses yields
qualitatively similar but higher estimates of households’ mileage allocations to Costco than those obtained
using road-network distances based on the Google Map API. Consequently, the results obtained from the
great-circle-distance approach represent a more conservative validation of our hypotheses. Moreover, the
estimates obtained from this approach are not subject to the structure of the road networks in the markets.
Thus, this approach offers more generalizability in the results’ interpretation as distance measures are not
subject to the infrastructure of specific markets, as would be the case when using road-network distances.
It is possible that our estimations of households’ mileage allocations to Costco using a point-topoint trip policy will yield excessive biases compared with those obtained from a trip-chaining approach
because of a disproportionate overestimation of the mileage for households located farther from Costco’s
stores. This is because the former policy does not account for the possibility of households’ bundling visits
to different stores as part of the same trip (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). To test for this possibility, we reran the
analyses by considering the effects of this form of trip chaining. As we do not have data on which trips
were bundled by the households, we use the trip-chaining policy for all store visits that each household
reported within the same day and calculate the shortest route and the corresponding distance across these
visits. To estimate the trip-chained distance on each day, we used the great-circle-distance approach and
the road-network-distance approach based on the Google Map API along with a traveling salesman solution
based on a branch and bound method (see the pseudo-code box). The estimations we obtained using the
trip-chaining procedure with either the great-circle-distance or the road-network-distance estimations
generated results consistent with our hypotheses.
Pseudo-code. Trip-chaining procedure.
Input: Trip-level consumer panel data
for each household i = 1, …, n do
for each day 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 do
if 𝑗$ > 1,
Construct a traveling salesman problem for trip stop 𝑡%$ for k = 1, …, 𝑗$ ;
if ∃ any 𝑡%$ = NaN, assign 𝑡%$ with city-specific average given by distance mileone-way;
Solve the traveling salesman problem for ∀𝑡%$ and let the minimized
distance be given by Φ&'( ;
)
;
Replace each 𝑡%$ with the average distance obtained from BCD
;
+
E

end

if 𝑗$ = 1 and 𝑡,$ != NaN,
Assign 𝑡,$ with computed point-to-point distance p2pone-way; else if 𝑡,$ = NaN,
Assign 𝑡,$ with city-specific average given by distance mileone-way;
end
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We also considered for each household a hybrid approach combining both the trip-chaining and
point-to-point trip policies as described previously and then estimated each household’s mileage using the
great-circle-distance approach and the road-network-distance approach based on the Google Maps API.
The results obtained with the hybrid approach are consistent with those obtained without combining the
trip-chaining and point-to-point trip policies. We implemented the hybrid approach as follows: (1) on days
when households did not patronize Costco, we randomized the use of the trip-chaining and point-to-point
trip policies, so a household has a 50% chance of chaining its trips on each of these days, and (2) on days
when households did patronize Costco, we vary the usage of trip chaining as a function of the distance
separating each household from Costco in its market. That is, we subjected households located the farthest
from Costco to using a trip-chaining policy on those days and subjected households located closest to
Costco to using a point-to-point trip policy when computing the mileage on those days. For households
whose distances from Costco fall between those of households located farthest and nearest to Costco in
their markers, the degree of trip chaining varies as a function of their normalized distance (X) to Costco
(where 0 < X < 1, bounded between the maximum and the minimum distance separating households from
Costco in their markets).

B. Data Reliability
The Homescan panel covers households’ visits to all major national and regional retail stores in the United
States. The panel excludes visits to minor independent stores, as these stores “are less important for
competition in most markets” (Bronnenberg et al. 2008, p.746). Thus, the panel provides an adequate store
representation of households’ shopping activity for the purposes of our research.
An additional concern is the level of reporting integrity among households participating in the
panel. To maintain a high level of integrity, ACNielsen has a policy of filtering households that fail to report
their transactions regularly or that provide unreliable records for their shopping trips. Once ACNielsen
drops these households from the panel, it replaces them with others that share similar demographic
characteristics (Muth et al. 2007).
In the past, scholars have observed a low degree of reporting errors among households in the panel.
In their study comparing panel data with retail points of sales data, Einav et al. (2010) documented an
underreporting error in the panel data (approximately 0.14) of similar magnitude to that found in other
commonly used household information data sets. Moreover, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) found that the
presence of underreporting in the data does not appear to constitute a source of bias in statistical estimates
because it does not exhibit any significant patterns over particular household demographic variables. The
results from our analysis, following the same approach as Aguiar and Hurst (2007), are consistent with this
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finding. We first separated the households in our sample into nine different age groups (based on the age
of households’ heads). We then estimated the average weekly shopping expenditure amount for each age
group in 2003 and divided it by the average weekly expenditure reported in the University of Michigan’s
Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the same age group and year (https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu).
Finally, we verified that these ratios did not fluctuate substantially across the age groups based on their low
coefficient of variation (0.03).

C. Panel’s Generalizability Relative to the Broader Population
To assemble the sample we used in the paper, ACNielsen adopts a stratified sampling strategy (similar to
the approach adopted by the U.S. Census) to ensure that the participating households are representative of
the markets in which they reside. ACNielsen also employs a projection factor calculation method via an
iterative proportional fitting procedure based on the Calmar software to create household-level projection
factors. The idea behind this approach is to construct weights to ensure that the panels match the
population on observed demographic variables (Oh and Scheuren 1983).
Despite ACNielsen’s sampling rigor, we performed our own evaluation to determine whether the
households sampled across the treatment markets had a variety of economic and demographic attributes
relevant to the generalizability of our findings that closely matched those in the broader population. The
first question we addressed is whether the households in our sample are representative of the markets in
which they reside. We chose household size and income to characterize household demographics, given their
relevance in household expenditures in our analysis. As Table C1 shows, the 95% confidence intervals for
average household size and median income straddle the mean for household size and median for household
income reported for each market by the U.S. Census. Because the U.S. Census does not provide standard
deviations for their estimates, we are not able to conduct a direct test of mean differences. However, we
can use the confidence intervals for the sample measurements to conclude that the households in our
sample are representative of the markets in which they reside. The second question we addressed is whether
the entire sample we used across all five markets is representative of the U.S. population. As the last row of
Table C1 shows, the 95% confidence intervals for the sample averages for household size and median
income straddle the U.S. figures obtained from the U.S. Census. In all, the results suggest that our sample
at the market level and as a whole is similar, in terms of household size and household income, to that of
the market population and the U.S. population.
In addition to evaluating these household attributes, we tested for biases among the mileage
amounts that our sample households allocated to shop at the stores compared with those in the broader
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population. To that end, we compared the average annual amount of shopping miles traveled by each
household in our sample with the annual average miles traveled per household for shopping trips as
reported by the Department of Transportation’s National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). The data in
the NHTS comprise all participating households’ shopping travel miles per year. Table C2 shows the annual
average and standard error per household estimated from our data in 2005 and the annual averages and
standard errors per household obtained from the NHTS in 2001 and 2009. The results from t-tests for
these measurements failed to detect any statistical differences between the average annual mileage per
household in our sample and that in the NHTS. We note that the Department of Transportation does not
conduct the NHTS on an annual basis. Prior surveys took place in 1983, 1990, 1995, 2001, 2009, and 2018.
Because 2005 is the midpoint between 2001 and 2009, our choice to contrast our data from 2005 to the
NHTS data from 2001 and 2009 aims to lessen any biases in the t-tests results that could result from
discrepancies in the timing of our data collection and that of the NHTS.
Table C1 Household Size and Annual Income Sample Statistics versus U.S. Census statistics
Average household size
Median household income
Sample
U.S. Census
Sample
U.S. Census
3.072 (1.64)
$44,048.19 (26,592.06)
El Paso
3.14
$40,784
[2.71, 3.43]
[38,241.65, 49,854.73]
2.28 (1.25)
$53,072.12 (27,610.71)
Des Moines
2.30
$54,139
[2.03, 2.52]
[47,702.52, 58,441.71]
2.32 (1.23)
$46,083.33 (23,120.44)
Greensboro
2.31
$41,628
[2.08, 2.56]
[41,542.05, 50,624.62]
2.64 (1.34)
$48,885.65 (26,615.36)
Hoover
2.50
$46,667
[2.46, 2.82]
[45,.855.74, 51,915.55]
1.94 (0.60)
$59,232.14 (25,876.66)
Myrtle Beach
2.17
$49,365
[1.70, 2.17]
[49,198.22, 69,266.06]
Sample
2.54 (1.36)
$49,633.33 (26,398.38)
2.57
$47,693
Average
[2.42, 2.65]
[47,401.79, 51,864.87]
Notes: Std. deviations are in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.
Market

Table C2 Annual Household Miles
Measure
Avg. annual miles per household
t-statistic
Notes: Std. errors are in parentheses.

2005 Sample Data
2926.12
(81.81)

2001 NHTS
3,062
(50.29)
-1.66

2009 NHTS
2,979
(95.90)
-0.64

D. PSW and PSM Procedures
We elaborate on the PSW procedure and provide validation of this procedure via the propensity score
covariate balance test. We then introduce the PSM method and present the results we obtained as a
robustness check.
D.1. PSW Procedure. PSAs typically rely on a predicted probability, also known as a propensity score, to
determine group (i.e., treatment vs. control) membership. Accordingly, a propensity score is the probability
that an individual observational unit (i.e., a household) receives a particular treatment, conditional on its
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observed covariates. Because these covariates are independent of the treatment for subpopulations of
observations with similar propensity scores, this approach helps mitigate biases when comparing treatment
and control households.
An advantage of using PSW is that it helps maximize the number of households retained in the
outcome analysis and does not require an outcome variable to be continuous or normally distributed (Guo
and Fraser 2009). To estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), we follow Hirano and
Imbens (2001) guidelines and calculate the propensity scores ê(x) via a probit regression, where x represents
the vector of observed covariates. We use the following covariates: household size, household income,
(combined) age of household head(s), preexisting membership by household at a WC retailer different from
Costco, retail gas prices paid by household, household–Costco store distance, and a squared term of
household–Costco store distance. We then define regression weights 𝜔 as
ê(x)

ω(W,x) = W+(1-W) 1-ê(x),

(D1)

where W = 1 indicates a treated household (W = 0, otherwise) and ê(x) is the estimated probability of being
treated. After obtaining these weights, we include them in the estimation of our DID regressions. Moreover,
we use logistic regression as a variation to the probit regression method to estimate the propensity score
ê(x). Our results are robust to using both variations (i.e., probit and logit regression). We further verify that
our weights properly balance the treatment and control groups by following Guo and Fraser (2009) to carry
out the validation procedure detailed in section D.2.
D.2. Propensity Score Covariate Balance Test for the PSW Approach. To validate the PSW approach,
we compare estimates from a series of unweighted and weighted regressions. In these regressions, we
choose a specific covariate (e.g., household size) as the dependent variable and select the treatment indicator
(i.e., whether a household is in the treatment group) as the independent variable. The model is specified as
X = β1 Treatment + β0 ,

(D2)

where X is equal to each covariate. A significant coefficient estimation (β1 ) means that there is a significant
difference between the treatment and control groups. Thus, for a covariate to be balanced across both
groups, β1 should be nonsignificant.
As an illustration, using household income as the dependent variable, we obtain a statistically
significant (β1 = 6,222.50, t-statistic = 21.24) coefficient estimate of the treatment status indicator derived
from the unweighted regression. However, we obtain a statistically nonsignificant (β1 = 735.20, t-statistic =
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1.57) coefficient estimate of the same when we use the weighted regression with probit link function. That
is, while treatment households tend to have higher average income than control households in the
unweighted case, our approach of weighting by the propensity score helps alleviate this difference. We
observed similar significant results in the unweighted case for the other covariates, except for household
size. The weighted regression approach mitigates these differences and provides evidence that our approach
adequately balances the data. Table D1 summarizes these results. The balance test for preexisting WC
membership covariate is omitted given perfect prediction of failure.
Table D1 Propensity Score Covariate Balance Test
Unweighted
Estimate
t-statistic
-0.0023 (0.0145)
-0.16
6222.50 (292.961)
21.24

Household size
Household income
(Combined) age of
2.4222 (0.1146)
household head(s)
Distance to Costco
-0.7534 (0.0153)
Distance2 to Costco
-5.3891 (0.1169)
Retail gas prices
-0.0314 (0.0049)
Notes: Std. errors are in parentheses.

Logit link function
Estimate
t-statistic
0.0579 (0.1167)
0.50
675.24 (475.28)
1.42

Probit link function
Estimate
t-statistic
0.0081 (0.0212)
0.38
735.20 (469.61)
1.57

21.14

-0.3671 (0.1617)

-2.27

-0.00246 (0.1599)

-1.54

-49.30
-46.09
-6.43

-0.0109 (0.0162)
0.0679 (0.1051)
-0.0153 (0.0072)

-0.67
0.65
-2.13

0.0066 (0.0163)
0.1539 (0.1038)
-0.022 (0.0155)

0.40
1.48
-1.43

D.3. PSM Procedure. In the PSM procedure, rather than including regression weights into the estimation
of our DID models, we perform one-on-one matching with replacement on the treatment and the control
households to minimize the two groups’ propensity score differences. We then use the treatment group
with the matched subset of the control group to perform the DID analysis.
We summarize the results based on the PSM method for the analyses included in sections 4.2 and
4.3 of the paper in Tables D2–D4. The results are consistent with those in the paper using the PSW
approach. Note, though, that with the PSM approach, we cannot use all observations because some have
no matches. In our case, we could use only 18,512 of 73,700 observations from 489 households rather than
all 540 households. Moreover, with the PSM approach, we obtained less conservative estimations for ηCostco
than with the PSW approach.
Table D2 Spent and Mileage at Stores Operating under Formats Different from Costco’s Stores
Spent (SOther
)
it

0.1176*** (0.0314)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSM
Yes
Observations
18,512
# Households
489
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage (MOther
)
it

0.0534* (0.0266)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
18,512
489
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Table D3 Spent and Mileage at All Retail Stores
Spent (SAll
it )
0.2633*** (0.0313)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSM
Yes
Observations
18,512
# Households
489
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage (MAll
it )
0.0789** (0.0257)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
18,512
489

Table D4 Moderating Impact of Distance on Spent and Mileage at Costco
Spent
-0.0032* (0.00129)
TREAT×AFTER×FAR
0.3791*** (0.0272)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSM
Yes
Observations
18,512
# Households
489
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage
0.0025** (0.0008)
0.1428*** (0.0138)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
18,512
489

E. Households’ Prior Memberships at Other WC Retailers
The results from our hypotheses tests may be influenced by whether treatment households had prior
memberships at WC stores different from the treatment stores. First, it is possible that shopping activity at
the treatment stores by treatment households with prior WC memberships at other stores differed from
shopping activity by treatment households with no prior WC memberships, due to the former households’
having more experience shopping under a WC format than the latter households. Second, it is also possible
that unobserved life events (e.g., childbirth) drove treatment households with no preexisting WC
memberships to begin shopping at the treatment stores. If so, shopping activity at the treatment stores by
these households may differ from those by treatment households with preexisting WC memberships.
Finally, it is possible that changes in shopping activity at non-WC stores observed after the treatment
application were more prominent among treatment households with no prior WC memberships than
among treatment households with preexisting WC memberships. Because the treatment application among
the former households represents an initial exposure to the WC model, it has the potential to be more
disruptive to shopping activity at other non-WC stores.
To determine whether shopping activities at treatment stores and non-WC stores are contingent
on households’ prior membership activity at WC retail stores different from Costco, we statistically tested
for differences in shopping activities at these stores between households that migrated from other WC
retailers to Costco versus households that became Costco members without any prior memberships at
other WC retailers. To that end, we use a triple DID model of AFTER it ×TREATi ×EXISTINGi , with
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households’ Spent and Mileage at Costco and at other non-WC stores as the dependent variables. This model
expands on the one we used in Equations (1a) and (1b) in section 4.2. In this case, however, we add

EXISTINGi , an indicator that equals 1 if the treatment household immigrated to Costco (previously
holding a membership at another WC retailer) or 0 if the treatment household became a Costco member
without prior memberships at other WC retailers (see Equations (E1) and (E2)). Per our DID model
specification, TREATi is a dummy variable that separates treatment households (migrant and new Costco
members) versus control households (those that did not join Costco). Moreover AFTER it is a dummy
variable that indicates when each treatment household joined Costco. Thus, as in the case in our hypotheses
testing analyses, the treatment date for each treatment household corresponds to the day the household
first visited Costco.
We are particularly interested in the values for the βS, 5 and βM, 5 coefficients in the following
equations. A statistically significant value for any of these coefficients would indicate that there is a
significant difference in shopping activity between migrant and new Costco members.
𝑙og(Sit +1)=aS,0i + γS,t + (βS,4 +βS,5 EXISTINGi ) × AFTER it × TREATi +εS,it

(E1)

𝑙og(Mit +1)=aM,0i + γM,t + (βM,4 +βM,5 EXISTINGi ) × AFTER it × TREATi +εM,it .

(E2)

As the results on the left panel in Table E1 show, we found no statistical differences between these
two groups of treatment households in their shopping activity at the treatment stores. The implication is
that prior membership at a WC retailer does not appear to moderate how households carry out their
shopping activities at these stores. By contrast, the results in the panel on the right show that households
with no prior WC memberships had significantly higher increases in their share of weekly expenditures and
mileage amounts assigned to non-WC stores than those with prior WC memberships.
These increases are consistent with those in Table 4 and therefore justify the need to include in the
PSA procedures a covariate that accounts for households’ memberships at WC retailers before joining
Costco to control for differences in the share of weekly expenditures and mileage at non-WC retail stores
between treatment households with and without prior WC memberships. In these procedures, households
in the treatment group that had prior WC memberships are matched with control households with WC
memberships that did not join Costco. In turn, treatment households that joined Costco without any prior
memberships at other WC retailers are matched with control households without WC memberships that
did not to join Costco. As a result, the differences in shopping activities we observe before versus after
treatment households joined Costco have already accounted for any inherent differences in prior WC
memberships between these households.
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Table E1 Moderating Impact of Preexisting Membership on Shopping Activity at
Costco Stores and non-WC stores
Spent
At Costco Stores
0.0287 (0.0568)
TREAT×AFTER×EXISTING
-0.0056 (0.0145)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSW
Yes
Observations
73,700
# Households
540
0.227
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage
At Costco Stores
0.0471 (0.0281)
-0.0032 (0.0071)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.225

Spent
At non-WC Stores
-0.1966* (0.0776)
0.1118* (0.0435)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.258

Mileage
At non-WC Stores
-0.2808*** (0.0594)
0.0944** (0.0324)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
73,700
540
0.371

F. Test of Parallel Trends Assumption
DID’s identification assumes that the outcomes in the treatment and control groups follow the same
longitudinal trend in the absence of the treatment. In testing this parallel trends assumption, we aim to
dismiss the possibility of a pretreatment trend difference in the dependent variables between the treatment
and control groups. To that end, we estimate the following model using data from the pretreatment period.
log(Sit +1) = aS,0i +γS,t +βS,1 t +βS,2 TREATi ×t + εS,it

(F1)

log(Mit +1) = aM,0i +γM,t +βM,1 t +βM,2 TREATi ×t + εM,it ,

(F2)

where S'( in Equation (F1) represents the weekly spending (in dollars) of household i, t denotes the number
of weeks lapsed since the start of the observation period, and TREATi = 1 if household i belongs to the
treatment group and 0 otherwise. The notation for i and t also applies for Equation (F2), with M'(
representing the weekly mileage for household i. The terms a and γ in Equations (F1) and (F2) denote
household fixed effects and weekly seasonality effects, respectively. The coefficient of interest in these
equations is βk,2 , where k ∈ K = {Sit , Mit }. This coefficient measures the difference in the trend of the
dependent variable between the treatment and control groups.
We ran the regressions for Spent and Mileage across all stores and also across all stores except
Costco’s. Table F1 shows the results of the parallel trends assumption test. The nonstatistically significant
estimates for βk,2 in Table F1 provide no evidence to suggest that there are different trends in the
pretreatment weekly measures between the treatment and control groups. This result addresses endogeneity
concerns that potential changes in the dependent variables were simply a consequence of a pretrend
characteristic.
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Table F1 Parallel Trends between Treatment and Control Group
Spent (SAll
Spent (SOther
)
Mileage (MAll
Mileage (MOther
)
it )
it
it )
it
-0.1088
(0.1502)
-0.1138
(0.1017)
0.0035
(0.0630)
-0.1144
(0.0938)
TREAT × t
Household fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
# Observations
19,952
19,952
19,952
19,952
# Households
540
540
540
540
Adj. R2
0.2472
0.2406
0.5883
0.4612
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

G. Placebo Tests for Spurious Correlations
We focus on Equations (1a) and (1b) in section 4.2 and apply placebo treatment indicators in weeks 12, 20,
30, 40, 50, and 60 in our analysis period. Table G1 reports the results for the treatment in week 12 for Spent
and Mileage as the dependent variables, across all retailers. The results show that the estimate for the
interaction term is not statistically significant. Because we also found similar results for the other placebo
dates, we have no evidence that unobserved shocks lead to changes in the dependent variables.
Table G1 Placebo Test with Fictitious Treatment on Week 12
Spent (SAll
it )
0.0315
TREAT×AFTER
(0.0819)
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSW
Yes
Observations
17,917†
# Households
540
0.3151
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
† Week 70 omitted because of collinearity.

Mileage (MAll
it )
0.0294
(0.0639)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
17,917†
540
0.4171

H. “Look-Ahead Matching” as an Alternative Sampling Strategy
We performed our DID analysis again, but using a different control group from the one in the paper. To
sample this control group, we used a “look-ahead matching” strategy, similar to that used by Xu et al. (2016)
and Manchanda et al. (2015). Under this strategy, the control sample included households that did not
reside in the five treatment markets we used for our analysis in the paper but instead resided in five other
markets in which Costco entered by opening one store right after our focal period of analysis (i.e., postSeptember 2006). Our goal in this test is to check for biases in our hypotheses testing from potential
endogeneity in Costco’s decisions to select specific markets for entry, including our treatment markets.
Note that we selected control households in the alternative sample by employing the same
conditions as in section 3.3 in the paper. Moreover, we used the same array of observable characteristics
and PSA approaches as in section 4.1 to tackle sampling biases induced by households’ self-selection in
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becoming Costco members. Thus, for our research purposes, the treatment households differed from the
control households in the alternative sample only in the timing of the stores’ opening by Costco.
Despite the slight gap in timing between Costco’s entry into our treatment markets and its entry
into the markets we used to assemble the new control sample, we considered whether the timing chosen by
Costco to enter the latter markets might have correlated with changes in households’ shopping activity in
those markets. This is an important consideration because such conditions could lead to biases in the
selection of the alternative sample of control households. Nevertheless, according to senior management
at Costco Wholesale, the local factors that Costco uses to decide when it enters a new market (which could
potentially cause selection biases) either are not time varying or vary slowly over time. These factors include
population growth, health of the economy, geography, and road infrastructure. Furthermore, differences
in the timing of store openings by Costco are subject to exogenous random factors such as local permits,
which make it difficult for Costco to time its market entries to match closely local changes in households’
shopping activity. As a result, it is unlikely that endogeneity in Costco’s decisions on when to enter the
alternative markets would bias our estimates.
As reported in Tables H1–H3, the estimation results from Equations (1a), (1b), (2a), and (2b) add
validity to the hypotheses testing results from sections 4.2 and 4.3. Moreover, the values estimated for ηCostco
(1.67) and the changes estimated for Spent (–0.32) and Mileage (0.46) over the distance separating Costco
stores and households are consistent with those obtained in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Thus, we find no evidence
that the results in sections 4.2 and 4.3 are subject to biases due to endogeneity in Costco’s entry decisions.
Table H1. Spent and Mileage at Stores Operating under Formats Different from Costco’s Stores
Spent (SOther
)
it
0.0956* (0.0458)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSW
Yes
Observations
256,276
# Households
2,337
0.217
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage (M23456
)
it
0.0678* (0.0332)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
256,276
2,337
0.422

Table H2 Spent and Mileage at All Retail Stores
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Seasonality
PSW
Observations
# Households

Spent (SAll
it )
0.1258** (0.0421)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
256,451
2,337

0.217
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage (MAll
it )
0.0865** (0.0334)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
256,451
2,337
0.317
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Table H3 Moderating Impact of Distance on Spent and Mileage at Costco
Spent
Mileage
-0.0032* (0.0014)
0.0046*** (0.0008)
0.4023*** (0.0229)
0.1245*** (0.0109)
Household fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
Weekly
PSW
Yes
Yes
Observations
256,276
256,276
# Households
2,337
2,337
0.283
0.295
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
TREAT×AFTER×FAR
TREAT×AFTER

I. Hypothesis Testing Results based on 30- and 25-mile Maximum Distances
Table I1 Spent and Mileage at Stores Operating under Formats Different from Costco’s stores
25 Miles

30 Miles
Spent (SOther
)
it
0.1056* (0.0457)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
PSM
Yes
Observations
54,102
# Households
377
0.265
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Mileage (MOther
)
it
0.0836* (0.0334)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
54,102
377
0.392

Spent (SOther
)
it
0.1052* (0.0459)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
48,947
341
0.292

Mileage (MOther
)
it
0.0826* (0.0335)
Yes
Weekly
Yes
48,947
341
0.392

Table I2 Spent and Mileage at All Retail Stores
30 Miles
Spent (SAll
Mileage (MAll
it )
it )
0.1179*** (0.0343)
0.1784*** (0.0465)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
Weekly
PSM
Yes
Yes
Observations
54,102
54,102
# Households
377
377
0.265
0.391
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

25 Miles
Spent (SAll
Mileage (MAll
it )
it )
0.1201*** (0.0343)
0.1779*** (0.0465)
Yes
Yes
Weekly
Weekly
Yes
Yes
48,947
48,947
341
341
0.262
0.392

Table I3 Moderating Impact of Distance on Spent and Mileage at Costco
30 Miles
Spent
Mileage
-0.0049*
(0.0023)
0.0047*** (0.0013)
TREAT×AFTER×FAR
0.1179*** (0.0343)
0.1784*** (0.0465)
TREAT×AFTER
Household fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Seasonality
Weekly
Weekly
PSM
Yes
Yes
Observations
54,102
54,102
# Households
377
377
0.265
0.391
Adj. R2
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

25 Miles
Spent
Mileage
-0.0045* (0.0022)
0.0052*** (0.0014)
0.1201*** (0.0343)
0.1779*** (0.0465)
Yes
Yes
Weekly
Weekly
Yes
Yes
48,947
48,947
341
341
0.262
0.392

J. Bootstrapping Procedure to test Hypothesis 1
The purpose of the bootstrapping procedure is to estimate the standard error associated with ηCostco
(Freedman and Peters 1984; Gonçalves and White 2005). With this standard error, we can then check for
statistical evidence to reject the null that ηCostco = 1. To implement this procedure, we used Stata 15 and a
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bootstrap function that repeatedly draws a sample with replacement to run a routine and a preset number
of replications:
1. Write a routine named costco_ratio to return the ratio of Spent to Mileage for Costco (ηCostco ). The
pseudo-code is as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Other
Conduct DID estimation for SAll
.
it and Sit
All
Conduct DID estimation for Mit and MOther
.
it
Other
Costco
Subtract SAll
with
S
=
S
.
it
it
it
Other
Subtract MAll
= MCostco
.
it with Mit
it
Take the ratio (SCostco
/MCostco
) and return the result stored in r(ratio).
it
it

2. Specify the number of replications (#) to compute the bootstrap estimate using the following
command. We also specify a random-number seed (1234) so that we can reproduce our results.
bootstrap r(ratio), reps(#) seed(1234): costco_ratio
According to Mooney and Duval (1993), 50 to 200 replications are generally suitable for estimates
of standard errors and thus are acceptable for normal-approximation confidence intervals. We chose 50 in
our study, and we obtained a standard error of 0.065 for ηCostco . Therefore, ηCostco is significantly different
than 1 because its 95% confidence interval is [1.545, 1.675].

K. Results from Pairwise χ2 Tests for TREAT×AFTER Coefficients in Table 7
Radius Length
Equilibrium + 10 mi.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium - 10 mi.

Unconstrained
0.03; 4.25*; 4.25*
2.25; 3.73*; 2.17
0.14; 3.90*; 0.30

Equilibrium + 10 mi.
--2.26; 4.26*; 3.73*
0.14; 4.05*; 0.20

Equilibrium
----0.55; 0.44; 0.92

Pair-wise χ2 test results for drugstore coefficients.
Pair-wise χ2 test results for general merchandise coefficients.
Pair-wise χ2 test results for supercenter coefficients.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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